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１．Reality of mandatory offer in the UK
 
According to the mandatory offer rule in the UK,when a person or
 
group acquires shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of a
(１)
company,they must make a cash offer to all other shareholders of the
 
company at the highest price paid in the12months before the offer was
 
announced.This is one of the core features of the UK takeover regula-
tions.However,in reality,the mandatory offer rule has been applied to
 
only a few cases,five to ten per year.Dispensation is granted in many
 
207
(１) We should note the difference from the rule for making a tender offer in
 
Japan (holding one-third of voting rights). The Japanese rule considers the
 
ratio of voting rights“to be acquired as a result of the offer,”whereas the UK
 
rule considers the ratio of voting rights “held at the time the offer is being
 
made.”
cases even when the requirements for application of this rule are
 
satisfied. It often occurs in the case of acquiring voting rights upon
 
issue of new shares(
(２)
whitewash),and there are some other cases where
 
this rule does not apply.
Most takeover bids made in the United Kingdom are not mandatory
 
but voluntary.The offeror must make an offer to all shareholders,but
 
if it holds shares carrying less than30% of the voting rights at the time
 
that the offer is being made,it can make a voluntary offer and does not
 
have to make a cash offer at the highest
(３)
price.A party with no voting
 
right can also make a voluntary offer to all shareholders.However,in
 
the case of a voluntary offer,the offeror can state detailed acceptance
 
conditions in an offer
(４)
document,whereas in the case of a mandatory
 
offer,the offeror is allowed to state only one condition,holding more
(２) Whitewash refers to cases where the injector of cash or the offeror,who
 
acquires shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights, can avoid the
 
mandatory offer rule by obtaining the shareholders’approval.In this case,the
 
injector should prepare a whitewash document equivalent to an offer document
 
by stating therein who the injector is and what his experience is,as well as in
 
what business the injector is engaged and what links exist between his business
 
and the offeree company’s business,and submit the document to the Executive
 
with a checklist via the offeree company’s adviser to obtain approval,and then
 
also obtain approval of at least half of the independent shareholders (share-
holders other than the people who will acquire allotments of new shares and
 
their concerned parties)who are present at the general meeting of shareholders.
(３) In addition to Rule9, the obligation to make a cash offer at the highest
 
price also applies under Rule6and Rule11.
(４) Takeover Code,Rule10-Rule13.Typical conditions include the following:
(i)a specific act should be conducted to maintain the offer;(ii)the supervisory
 
authorities should approve control transfer when the offeror acquires a license
 
necessary for continuing the business of the target company;However, the
 
Panel basically does not permit subjective conditions (conditions that exclu-
sively depend on the offeror’s decisions)(Rule13).
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than 50% of the voting rights,and it should make a cash offer at the
 
highest price within the preceding 12months.
Although it is true that the mandatory offer rule is,without a doubt,
one of the cores of the UK takeover regulations, this rule is multi-
structured and is applicable only in a few cases, in reality.However,
this does not mean that the mandatory offer rule exists only in its
 
framework.It could rather be said that the existence of the mandatory
 
offer rule fully functions as a deterrent against easy transfer of control;
its purport also has an influence even in cases where the rule does not
(５)
apply.
The vast majority of dispensation from the mandatory offer rule
 
relates to whitewash,80to 90cases per year according to the recent
 
statistics.Furthermore,if the offeree company has a very small number
 
of shareholders,dispensation may also be granted with the permission
 
of the
(６)
Panel.
The substantial significance of this rule is its existence as a “strict
 
rule that an offeror must avoid,”and as a result,the rule functions as
 
a deterrent against easy acquisition of shares carrying 30% or more of
 
the voting rights.In practice,the mandatory offer rule usually applies
 
these cases:(i)the offeror,due to its adviser’s mistake,has acquired
 
shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of the offeree com-
(５) For instance,the Code provides that a person who satisfies certain require-
ments may acquire shares carrying more than 30% of the voting rights of the
 
offeree company before making an offer (Rule5.2).However,because of the
 
existence of the mandatory offer rule, a shareholder who intends to make a
 
voluntary offer is made to give up the idea of acquiring shares carrying more
 
than 30% of the voting rights before making an offer.
(６)The Takeover Panel,Note to Advisers in relation to Code Waivers（Last
 
revised 20May2006).
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pany before making an offer;or(ii)the offeror,after making an offer,
is likely to be able to acquire a number of shares in bulk in the market,
and decides to make a separate offer through the market pursuant to
 
the mandatory offer rule.
２．Strong “shareholder decision-making principle”
and the preconditions thereof
 
A typical attitude seen within the framework of UK companies law
 
and capital market law,especially in the phase of control transfer by
 
way of takeovers,is a strong “shareholder decision-making principle.”
This principle is completely different from the“principle of maximizing
 
the shareholder value,”which is common among US companies. It is
 
well known that,in the United States,the management is under very
 
strong pressure to maximize the stock price or shareholder value.
Decisions on important matters of a company are made by the manage-
ment and the shareholders,equally.
Also in the United Kingdom,a company can introduce a rights plan
(poison pill)based on a resolution of the general meeting of share-
holders.The introduction of defensive measures before an offer period
 
is excluded from the Panel’s regulations,and it is also not restricted
 
under the Companies Act.Furthermore,even after the management of
 
the target company becomes aware that an authorized offer is going to
 
be made in the near future, they can introduce defensive measures if
 
adopted at the general meeting of shareholders.
However, in the United Kingdom where institutional investors are
 
said to have the strongest power in the market,an attempt to introduce
 
a rights plan (poison pill)usually fails due to strong opposition from
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such investors,who argue that they would be deprived of the opportu-
nity to sell shares when an offer is
(７)
made.The same applies to other
 
types of defensive measures.For instance,issuing multi-voting shares
 
is not legally prohibited but the issuing company would receive a
 
penalty in the form of a decline in the market price of its shares.It is
 
said that among the companies listed in the United Kingdom,only ten
 
companies or so have issued multi-voting shares as a defensive mea-
sure. Furthermore, new shares must be issued by offering them to
 
shareholders(rights issue).
Thus,there may be no doubt that such strong institutional investors
 
exist behind the UK shareholders’decision-making principle.However,
the UK takeover regulations establish a framework wherein not only
 
institutional investors gain benefits but each and individual shareholder
 
can make a decision independently.The Code provides for fair treat-
ment of shareholders (Principles), and embodies the purport of this
 
principle in Rules 6,9,11,16,and so forth.Rule9,which addresses a
 
mandatory offer,is a typical provision of fair treatment of shareholders
 
under which shareholders may,once an offer is made, receive a pre-
mium and exit from the company.
The precondition for making the strong “shareholders decision-
making principle”work is sufficient information disclosure to share-
holders.For instance,an offer document must cover a number of points
 
including the following:information on the offeror and its strategic
(８)
plan;the offeror’s intention regarding the continued employment of
(７) Another large factor is the existence of the investment guidelines for
 
institutional investors(e.g.,Preemption Group Guideline).
(８) In Japan,there is a critical view about obliging the offeror to disclose a
 
detailed business plan.In the United Kingdom,although the offeror is obliged
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employees of the offeree
(９)
company;a cash flow statement;the offeror’
s intention regarding the transfer of the shares to be acquired and the
 
information on final shareholders(Code,Rule24).
The offer timetable is elaborately designed for shareholders.There is
 
a time when they are not in an offer period,a time when they are in an
 
offer period without a price,and a time when they are in receipt of an
 
offer at a very clear price.At each stage,shareholders know precisely
 
what is going on (Rules 30 to 34). There is also a provision on the
 
period during which the potential offeror should announce and publish
 
its intention to make an offer,called put up or shut up(Rule2.5).This
 
provision effectively prevents the offeror from announcing a vague
 
intention to make an offer or from withdrawing the intention,thereby
 
confusing the management of the offeree company or manipulating
 
stock price.
to give an explanation about a business plan and its reasonableness, it is not
 
required to disclose the details of the plan (particularly when making a cash
 
offer for all shareholders).It is also rare in this country for the offeree company
 
to repeatedly ask detailed questions to the offeror about its business strategy.
The offeror does not have to disclose more information than required under the
 
Code(Rule24.1).However,when the offeree company suggests any incorrect
 
or unclear statements in the document,the offeror corrects such statements as
 
advised by the Panel.
(９) The offeror should state its“employment policy”in an offer document.The
 
employees(or their representative)have the opportunity to state their opinions
 
on the employment policy but do not have the right to have the offer with-
drawn.In Japan,the necessity to disclose an employment policy is sometimes
 
questioned on the grounds that it will be irrelevant to shareholders after they
 
sell off shares.On the other hand,in the United Kingdom,this requirement is
 
established based on the concept that shareholders must be appropriately
 
informed,before making the decision of whether or not to sell off shares,about
 
what kind of company the offeror is as well as its strategy and experience.
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３．Characteristics of the Takeover Regulations
 
by the Takeover Panel
 
The takeover regulations enforced by the Takeover Panel are char-
acteristic on the following points.
(a）Composition and redeployment of members of the Panel
 
The term “Panel”in a broad sense refers to the organization as a
 
whole.The“Panel”in a narrow sense is composed of up to12members
 
who are designated by the Chairman,Deputy Chairmen(appointed by
 
the Panel)and the affiliated bodies and then appointed by the Panel,as
 
well as members appointed by said bodies.Currently,Panel members
 
have a maximum of34seats.The term of office is three years, and
 
reappointment is allowed.Those affiliated bodies that play an impor-
tant role in the City are entitled to appoint and send their personnel as
 
Panel members,who contribute to the activities of the Panel.
Some people express concern that since most members come from
 
the financial industry,the regulations enforced by the Panel would be
 
somewhat inclined in favor of the industry.However,as far as I myself
 
have surveyed,no particular problem has occurred thus far.The Panel
 
enjoys a high status in the financial industry(the City).Any wrong-
doing by someone serving as Panel member would later cause signifi-
cant problems to the member’s business. Therefore, Panel members,
while in office,engage in regulatory activities independently from the
 
entities to which they belong.Almost all leading investment banks,law
 
firms and accounting firms have executives who have served as Panel
 
members,and they provide the Panel with talented employees who have
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potential to be their executive staff in the future.These secondees to
 
the Executive concentrate on takeover regulations for two years,and
 
then go back to their banks or firms once they have developed their
 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the regulations.
Thus, this recruitment system is greatly beneficial to all parties
 
involved:those who can develop their careers, the entities to which
 
they return after acquiring experience,as well as the Panel itself,which
 
can secure high quality staff.
(b）Prompt and flexible application of rules,and consultation by the
 
Executive
 
The Executive carries out the Panel’s day-to-day work.It is current-
ly staffed by about 30people.Upon receiving an inquiry by telephone,
it gives an answer usually on the same day.In principle,two members
(a junior member and a senior member)take charge of one case,and
 
if any difficulties occur,they can ask for advice from other members.
In order to ensure consistency of decisions by the Executive,telephone
 
conversations are recorded and imparted to other members as feed-
back.The records of cases that the Executive has handled are compiled
 
into a database,which is not available to the public.
The Code contains a number of phrases that recognize the Panel’s
 
discretionary power,such as “except with the consent of the Panel,”
“with the consent of the Panel,”“unless otherwise agreed with the
 
Panel,”“should consult the Panel,”and so forth.The Executive has the
 
power to hand down rulings. An appeal may be filed against an
 
Executive’s ruling, but it is very rare for its rulings to be reversed
 
through appeal proceedings.
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(c）Cooperation with and sanctions upon the major bodies in the City
(before establishing the FSA)
The Panel has enforced regulations in cooperation with the major
 
bodies in the City.In the past,the Panel required these bodies―includ-
ing securities exchanges, the Bank of England, the former DTI―to
 
report offenders or take measures that the Panel considers appropriate.
At the time when the Panel was established, its enforcement was
 
insufficient, and some people did not mind breaching the Code. The
 
Panel even took tough measures against such breach by asking the
 
exchange to suspend the offender’s transactions and prohibit its use of
 
the facilities of the
(10)
exchange.
(d）Relationship with the FSA
 
After the Financial Services and Markets Act2000was entered into
 
force and the Financial Services Authority(FSA)was established,the
 
Panel carried out regulatory activities backed up by“indirect regula-
tions”by the FSA.Upon request by the Panel, the FSA may impose
 
sanctions on financial service firms that have breached the
(11)
Code.The
 
cold-shoulder rule is also applied to prohibit financial service firms
 
from conducting any acts in relation to takeovers on behalf of those
 
who breached the
(12)
Code.
(10) This is called the Saint Piran Case. It was the beginning of the cold-
shoulder rule,i.e.,the people in the City do not work for those who do not follow
 
the Code in the City.It is said that the successful implementation of this rule
 
resulted in firmly establishing the authority of the regulations by the Panel.The
 
Takeover Panel, Statements, Suspension of offeree company shares pending
 
statement by the Panel following a Panel hearing (Saint Piran Limited,1980/
4).
(11) Section134of the Financial Services and Markets Act2000(FSMA),and
4.2.1R of FSA Handbook,Market Conduct (MAR).
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Since the FSA has become the only regulatory authority and acquired
 
a broad power,a conflict of powers has occurred between the FSA and
 
the Panel.To cope with this problem,the FSA has developed guidelines,
which provide the following : the FSA shall not exercise its power
 
during the offer period;and even when the FSA exercises its power in
 
exceptional cases,it shall consult the Panel in advance if its exercise of
 
power is likely to affect the timetable or outcome of the
(13)
offer.
(e）Appeal proceedings
 
The Executive holds a hearing and hands down a ruling on the case
 
under the following circumstances:the Panel finds any act that is in
 
breach of the Code and should be subject to disciplinary action;the
 
party is dissatisfied with the Panel’s decision;a difficult issue occurs
 
and the Executive is unable to decide
(14)
on it.An appeal may further be
 
filed against the Executive’s ruling based on the results of the
(15)
hearing.
The availability of such due process is an important reason for the
 
courts to basically respect the Panel’s decisions. It is difficult for the
 
parties to a takeover to go to the court without first going through
 
appeal proceedings.
(12) 4.3.1R of FSA Handbook,Market Conduct (MAR).
(13) Operating Guidelines between the Financial Services Authority and the
 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers on Market Misconduct (6 April 2007).
Formulated in 2001,and partially revised in 2006and 2007.
(14) Hearings were previously held by the Full Panel,and they are currently
 
held by the Hearings Committee.
(15) In the past, the second appeal was examined by the Appeal Committee
 
within the Panel.After the national legislation transposing the EU Takeover
 
Directive (the entry into force of the Companies Act 2006), the Takeover
 
Appeal Board was established as an independent body from the Panel, and
 
skilled legal professionals of the board deal with the appeal cases.
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(f）Restrained attitude of courts in judicial review
 
The court does not interfere with the Panel during the offer period,
and even when it makes a judicial review,it does not directly involve
 
itself in the case. In the past few cases filed for judicial review, the
 
courts showed
(16)
restraint.
(g）Others
 
There are other reasons why the Panel has been successful,as a self
-regulating body,in carrying out takeover regulations effectively.(i)
The first factor is the Panel’s prompt response to offers.In the United
 
Kingdom,when a tender offer is made, the board of directors of the
 
offeree company swiftly decides whether or not to recommend the offer
 
and notifies shareholders of its decision.They do not hold its decision
 
or gain time without good reasons,which often occurs in Japan.The
 
offeror’s attribute or nationality rarely matters as long as the offeror
 
observes the UK takeover rules and principles.
(ii)Secondly,the professionalism of the people working in the finan-
cial industry in the City,which was originally authorized as self-gov-
ernment under the Magna Carta,is unimaginably stronger than that in
 
Japan.They place great importance on maintaining the industry where
 
they belong and their own profession.
From the perspective of enforcement,there is a significantly impor-
tant fact that in the United Kingdom,it has become a de facto obliga-
tion for both the offeror and the offeree to have
(17)
advisers,and(iii)as
(16) Regina v Panel on Take-overs,ex parte Datafin plc［1987］QB815;Regina
 
v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers,Ex Parte Guinness Plc.［1989］2W.L.R.
863;Regina v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers,ex parte Fayed and others
［1992］BCLC 938.
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a result, takeover rules have been enforced by way of not only the
 
parties to a takeover but also such advisers from investment banks, etc.
As mentioned above, the customary rule (cold-shoulder rule)---the
 
people in the City do not work for those who do not follow the Code in
 
the City---has been established as a norm.It seems that this norm has
 
served as a very powerful norm to the people both in and outside the
 
City because it would be difficult to be a party to a takeover without
 
an adviser.
Both the offeror and the offeree have their own advisers, and the
 
rival offeror will also have its own adviser.It depends on the case for
 
which party each investment bank,etc.is to serve as an adviser.Under
 
such circumstances,it could be said that(iv)the Panel’s decisions have
 
not been inclined in favor of any one of the parties due to structural
 
reasons, because the industry itself has continued to provide Panel
 
members.Thus,(v)in the City,the regulating party and the regulated
 
party have the same nature,and this may also be a big factor that has
 
made the Panel’s self-regulation effective.
※ This note is a part of my article on UK takeover regulations and was
 
prepared for the meetings with the specialists in Takeovers in the UK.
Further,“Notice to Advisers in Contested Bids”which was added at the
 
end of this note is the notice put up on the wall of the waiting room of
 
the UK Takeover Panel.
(Professor,Faculty of Law,Waseda University)
(17) An offeror who makes a cash offer must submit a financing statement
 
prepared by its adviser,whereas the offeree company must obtain competent
 
and independent advice on the offer from a third party,such as its adviser.
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(追記)
本研究ノートは、英国企業買収規制に関する渡辺の論考の英語版の一部で
あり、英国のM&A関係者との質疑のために用意されたものである。（本誌
本号に掲載されている、「〔研究会報告〕英国M&A弁護士との対話（英国
企業買収ルール）」も併せてご参照頂ければ幸いである。）末尾に添付した
「Notice to Advisers in Contested Bids」は、テイクオーバー・パネルの訪
問者用待合室の壁に掲示されている注意書きであり、英国のM&A実務家
の間では有名なものである。パネルの規制の基本ポリシーを簡明な言葉で表
現した、含蓄とウイットに富んだ文章である。パネルよりコピーを入手し、
待合室に掲示されているそのままの形で掲載した。
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